Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana Bank by Dickson, Rachael
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology 
& Intellectual Property Law 
Volume 25 
Issue 2 Spring 2015 Article 7 
Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana Bank 
Rachael Dickson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip 
Recommended Citation 
Rachael Dickson, Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana Bank, 25 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 467 (2015) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol25/iss2/7 
This Case Summaries is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law by an authorized 
editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
HANA FINANCIAL, INC. V. HANA BANK,
135 S. CT. 907 (2015)
1. INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Hana Financial first sued Respondent Hana Bank
in the District Court for the Central District of California, alleging
violations of its federally registered trademark.' Respondent de-
nied infringement by claiming that it had priority to the mark un-
der the tacking doctrine. 2 The District Court initially granted
summary judgment to Petitioner on the infringement claim, how-
ever, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the deci-
sion, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact as to
which party had priority to the trademark.3 On remand, the jury
gave a verdict in favor of Respondent Hana Bank.4 The District
Court denied Hana Financial's motion for judgment as a matter of
law.5
The verdict was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, holding that tacking was an appropriate question of
fact for the jury.6 Petitioner Hana Financial then appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States, which granted certiorari on
the question of whether tacking should be decided by judges or ju-
ries.7
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, writing for the Supreme Court,
concluded that whether two marks may be tacked for purposes of
determining priority is a question for the jury.8 The Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment for the respondent Hana Bank.9
1 Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907 (2015).2 1d. at 910.
3 id.
4 1d.
SId.
7 Hana, 135 S. Ct. at 911 (2015).
81d.
9Id.
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II. BACKGROUND
Respondent Hana Bank, a subsidiary of Hana Financial
Group, was first established in 1971 in Korea under the name Ko-
rea Investment Finance Corporation. 10 The company changed its
name to "Hana Bank" in 1991 and began using that name in Ko-
rea" 1. In 1994, Hana Bank began a service called "Hana Overseas
Korean Club" to provide financial services for Korean expatriates
and started to advertise that service in the United States.' 2 The ad-
vertisements included the name "Hana Overseas Korean Club" in
English and Korean and the name "Hana Bank" in Korean, along
with the respondent's "dancing man" logo.' 3 In 2000, the re-
spondent changed the name of its expatriate financial services
branch to "Hana World Center."' 14 The respondent began operat-
ing under the name "Hana Bank" in 2002, in its first physical ap-
pearance in the United States.
15
In 1994, Petitioner Hana Financial was established as a
California corporation.' 6 Petitioner began using that name and an
associated trademark in interstate commerce in 1995."7 In 1996,
petitioner was granted a federal trademark registration for a pyra-
mid logo with the name "Hana Financial" for use in connection
with financial services.'8
Petitioner sued respondent in 2007, alleging infringement
of its "Hana Financial" trademark. 19 Respondent Hana Bank de-
nied infringement, invoking the tacking doctrine.2 ° The District
Court's initial grant of summary judgment to respondent was re-
versed by the Ninth Circuit, which determined that there were
10 Id. at 909.
SId
12 id.
13 Hana, 135 S. Ct. at 909.
141d.
15 id.
161d. at 910.
17 id.
18 id.
'9 Hana, 135 S. Ct. at 910.
20 ,,
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genuine issues of material fact as to priority.2 1 On remand, a jury
granted a verdict in favor of respondent Hana Bank.22 The peti-
tioner's motion for judgment as a matter of law was denied.23
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, ex-
plaining that tacking "requires a highly fact-sensitive inquiry" that
is "reserved for the jury."24 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that
there is a circuit split on whether tacking should be decided by
judges or juries, but noted that it was resolving the issue in this
way because of the Ninth Circuit's similar view of likelihood of
confusion as a question of fact.25 At that time, the Sixth Circuit
and the Federal Circuit, as well as the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board, had expressly held that tacking was a legal question.26
Hana Financial, Inc. petitioned the Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari on April 7, 2014.27 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari on June 23, 2014.28
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, writing for the unanimous Su-
preme Court, quickly got to the point and stated that a determina-
21 id.
22 Id. The jury was instructed:
A party may claim priority in a mark based on the first use
date of a similar but technically distinct mark where the pre-
viously used mark is the legal equivalent of the mark in ques-
tion or indistinguishable therefrom such that consumers con-
sider both as the same mark. This is called 'tacking.' The
marks must create the same, continuing commercial impres-
sion, and the later mark should not materially differ from or
alter the character of the mark attempted to be tacked. Id.23 id.
24 id.
25 Hana Financial v. Hana Bank, 735 F.3d 1158, 1164 n.5 (9th Cir.
2013) ("Although the other circuits have not decided the issue yet, the
district court in circuits where likelihood of confusion is a question of
fact also treat tacking as a question of fact").
26 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hana at 22, 135 S. Ct. 907 (No. 13-
1211).27 Hana, 135 S. Ct. at 910.
2 8 id.
2015]
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tion of whether tacking should be applied "falls comfortably with-
in the ken of a jury."29 She then dismissed the petitioner's four ar-
guments for why tacking should be a question of law.30 First, she
determined that the application of a legal standard does not require
resolution by a judge.3 1 Second, Sotomayor dismissed concerns
about the precedential effect of tacking determinations by a jury.
32
Third, it was determined that a lack of predictability of tacking de-
cisions due to assignment to a jury was also not a good enough
reason to make it a question of law. 33 Finally, Sotomayor con-
cluded that the petitioner's reliance on historical resolution of tack-
ing disputes by judges was ill-placed on non-representative cas-
es.
34
A. A Question for the Jury
The Court noted first that the general rule of tacking as
adopted by lower courts has been that "two marks may be tacked
when the original and revised marks are legal equivalents. 35
Marks that are legally equivalent create "the same continuing
commercial impression so that consumers consider both as the
same mark.",
36
29 1d. at911.
3 0 id.
31 ld. at 911-912.
321d. at 912.
33 id.
34 id.
31 Hana, 135 S. Ct. at 909. (internal quotation marks omitted).
36 Brief for the Petitioner, Hana, 135 S. Ct. 907 (No. 13-1211), at 19.
The petitioners expanded upon the rationale for this test in their initial
brief, stating;
[I]f two marks are not so similar that consumers would regard
them as essentially identical, tacking would impermissibly
expand the trademark owner's rights. The rationale for this re-
quirement mirrors the first: even if the marks look and sound
alike, they will nonetheless create a different monopoly if they
present different commercial impressions. Once again, if the
preemptive scope of the marks differ, tacking is impermissi-
ble.
470
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The Court concluded that the application of tacking, a test
that is dependent upon an ordinary consumer's understanding,
should generally be made by a jury.37 In support, Sotomayor quot-
ed Railroad Co. v. Stout, noting "it is assumed that twelve men
know more of the common affairs of life than does one man, [and]
that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts
thus occurring than can a single judge." 38
The opinion did note that judges might determine whether
two marks may be tacked in some instances, such as in a bench tri-
al, on a motion for summary judgment, or for judgment as a matter
of law. 39 The Court's conclusion on the overall issue was narrow-
ly phrased, stating "we hold only that, when a jury trial has been
requested and when the facts do not warrant entry of summary
judgment or judgment as a matter of law, the question whether
tacking is warranted must be decided by a jury."40
B. The Petitioner's Arguments
Next, Justice Sotomayor took apart the Petitioner's argu-
ments that tacking should be decided as a question of law.4 1
The Petitioner first argued that the "legal equivalents" test
involved the application of a legal standard.42 Though the Court
conceded that this was true, it also pointed out that juries have typ-
ically resolved mixed questions of law and fact.43 Sotomayor stat-
ed that any concerns about the jury improperly applying the rele-
vant legal standard could be resolved by crafting careful jury
Id. (quoting Van Dyne-Crotty v. Wear-Guard Corp., 926 F.2d 1156,
1159 and Brookfield Communications, Inc v. West Coast Entertain-
ment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1045-48 (9th Cir. 1999), among others)
(internal quotation marks omitted).37 Hana,136 S. Ct. at 911.38 1d. (quoting Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657, 664 (1874)).
39id
40 id.
4l1id.
42 id.
43 Hana, 135 S. Ct. at 911.
2015]
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instructions, such as those that were agreed upon at the district
court level in Hana.
44
Second, the petitioner argued that tacking determinations
will "create new law that will guide future tacking disputes," and
that this is a task reserved for judges.45 The Court pointed out,
however, that the petitioner had not explained why a tacking de-
termination in one case would create new law any more than a jury
verdict in other types of cases.46 Justice Sotomayor disagreed with
the petitioner's assertion that tacking questions "have to be" re-
solved by comparing two marks in a given case to those addressed
in previous tacking cases, noting that there was no support for this
argument.47 She stated that judges may look to past cases in decid-
ing summary judgment motions or bench trials, but that there was
no explicit requirement. 48 She then pointed out that the cases the
petitioner cited to prove its point relied on precedent only to define
the relevant legal standard.4
Third, the petitioner argued that if juries were to decide
tacking questions, "the predictability required for a functioning
trademark system" would be absent.50 The Court dismissed this
concern as well, noting that juries often make dispositive determi-
nations in the area of tort, contract, and criminal law."1 "The fact
that another jury, hearing the same case, might reach a different
conclusion may make the system 'unpredictable,' but it has never
stopped us from employing juries in these analogous contexts.
52
In this case, the Petitioner provided no reasoning for why trade-
mark tacking should be treated differently than other cases.53 So-
tomayor also stated that as decision making in fact-intense disputes
44 Id. at 912.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
5 0 Hana, 135 S. Ct. at 912.
51 id.
52 id.
53 Id.
472
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necessarily required judgment calls, there was always some degree
of uncertainty involved.
54
Finally, the petitioner argued that historically, judges have
always resolved tacking disputes.55 However, the Court noted that
all of the cases the petitioner relied on for this argument were
bench trials, at summary judgment, or similarly situated.56 Judges
undisputedly may resolve tacking disputes in those contexts.57 But
when the facts do not support summary judgment or judgment as a
matter of the law, tacking is a question for the jury to decide. 58
IV. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The Hana Financial v. Hana Bank decision, the first sub-
stantive trademark decision by the Supreme Court in over a dec-
ade, 5 looks fairly straightforward at first glance. However, this
decision actually has several layers to it that could affect trade-
mark litigation in several ways.60
First, the Hana decision may very well raise litigation costs
in cases where tacking is an issue, as lawyers will want to include
54 Id.
55id.
56 Id.at 913, (citing to Drexel Enterprises, Inc. v. Richardson, 312 F.2d 525, 526
(10th Cir. 1962) ("It was tried without a jury"); Perfectform Corp. v. Perfect
Brassiere Co., 256 F.2d 736, 738 (3rd Cir. 1958) ("The District court dismissed
the complaint"; John Morrell & Co. v. Hauser Packing Co., 20 F.2d 713 (9th
Cir. 1927) ("In the court below, there was a dismissal of both the bill and of de-
fendant's counterclaim"); Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 299 F.
834, 835 (D.N.J. 1924) (equitable claims tried solely before a judge))
57 id.
58 1d.
59 The last substantive trademark case decided by the court was KP Permanent
Makeup, Inc. v. Lasting Impression, Inc. (in which the Court determined that a
party asserting a fair use defense to a trademark infringement claim did not need
to negate any likelihood that the practice in question would confuse consumers
about the origin of the goods.) KP Permanent Makeup, Inc. v. Lasting Impres-
sion, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004).
60 It should be noted first that the parties in this suit were most concerned about
the standard of review granted by an appellate court to a district court's finding
of tacking. Though there are clear advantages in trademark litigation to having a
jury of twelve decide a consumer based test rather than a judge, this is less im-
portant in litigation than the ability to appeal.
2015]
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more expert testimony for the jury. 6 1 The resolution of tacking as
a question of fact may also result in more disputes over priority at
the trial stage, as opposed to being resolved on summary judg-
ment.62 On the other hand, tacking may now be easier to prove.
As demonstrated in the Hana record, judges historically have been
quite strict in tacking determinations and have often only applied it
in very limited circumstances. 64 Now that juries relying on their
own impressions will determine tacking, it is likely that jury's ap-
plication of the test may be less strict.
Second, it is important to point out that though the court
decided the standard of review for trademark tacking, it never ex-
pressly upheld the tacking doctrine itself or stated whether its test
is valid.65 In fact, Justice Sotomayor went out of her way to avoid
voicing any sort of support for the doctrine, describing the doctrine
and its test in terms of what "lower courts have provided" and in
what situations "lower courts have found" tacking rather than us-
ing any language affirming the doctrine.66 The case itself was re-
solved by looking at cases from "a variety of doctrinal contexts"
rather than trademark cases.67
61 Steve Borgman, Lawyers Weigh In On High Court Trademark Tacking Rul-
ing, Law360, http://www.law360.com/articles/613629/lawyers-weigh-in-on-
high-court-trademark-tacking-ruling (January 21, 2015 7:34 pm).
62 Id.
63 Ross A. Dannenberg, Lawyers Weigh In On High Court Trademark Tacking
Ruling, Law360, http://www.law360.com/articles/613629/lawyers-weigh-in-on-
high-court-trademark-tacking-ruling (January 21, 2015 7:34 pm).
64 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 36, at 35.The Petitioner's initial brief
pointed to several cases in which tacking was disallowed by the Trademark Tri-
al and Appeal Board where the marks seemed almost exactly the same. In Am.
Paging, Inc. v. Am. Mobilphone, Inc., the TTAB refused to grant tacking be-
tween AMERICAN MOBILPHONE and AMERICAN MOBILPHONE
PAGING, even though those two marks had an identical stars and stripes de-
sign. Am. Paging, Inc. v. Am. Mobilphone, Inc., 13 U.S.P.Q.2D 2036, 2037-
2938 (T.T.A.B. 1989), affd, 923 F.2d 869 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In Pro-Cuts v.
Schilz-Price Enters., Inc., the TTAB disallowed tacking between PRO-CUTS
and PRO-KUT. Pro-Cuts v. Schilz-Price Enters., Inc., 27 U.S.P.Q.D.2d 1224,
1227 (T.T.A.B. 1993).
65 See Hana, 135 S. Ct. at 913.
66 Id. at 907
67 Id.
474
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This avoidance may be due to the fact that neitherparty ar-
gued against the validity of the tacking doctrine itself. 8 Such
careful evasion, however, indicates that the Court may still have
qualms about the doctrine and the test itself.
Third, the Court used Hana to once again implicitly deny
IP exceptionalism. 69 IP exceptionalism has been defined as "the
widely held belief that IP cases are immune from the influence of
judicial ideology., 70 The Court referenced trademark cases only in
defining the standard and test set out by the lower court.71 The ac-
tual holding of the case 72 was derived from decisions hailing from
real estate law, 73 obscenity,74 and tort law.75 The Court further re-
futed IP exceptionalism by noting that, "Petitioner has offered no
reason why trademark tacking ought to be treated differently [than
the tort, contract, and criminal justice systems]" in regards to con-
cerns about unpredictable systems of law.
76
The Hana holding falls in line with several recent Supreme
Court holdings in intellectual property cases. Just a day before the
Hana ruling came down, the Court held in Teva Pharmaceuticals
v. Sandoz that the Federal Circuit should review factual findings
681Id. at 91 On.1.
69 Matther Sag, Tonja Jacobi & Maxim Sytch, Ideology and Exception-
alism in Intellectual Property: An Empirical Study, 97 CALIF. L. REV.,
801 (2009) (The article further describes this viewpoint by noting that
"it is certainly the dominant view among intellectual property (IP)
scholars that copyright, patent, and trademark cases hinge on doctrinal
rules and policy issues specific to IP.").
70 ld.
71 Hana, 135 S. Ct. at 907.
72 Id. ("[W]hen the relevant question is how an ordinary person or community
would make an assessment, the jury is generally the decisionmaker that ought to
provide the fact-intensive answer. .. ").
73 Id. (citing United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 512 (1995), hold-
ing that the defendant was entitled to jury determination of the "materi-
ality" of the false statements at issue on federal loan documents under
the due process clause and the constitutional right to a jury trial).741d. (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-05 (1974),
holding that the brochures at issue were obscene).
75 Id. (citing Railroad Co v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657, 664 (1874), holding
that a landowner could be liable for the injuries of a child trespasser).
76 Id. at 912.
2015] 475
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made in patent claim construction under a clear error standard.77
In that case, Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, noted, "even if
exceptions to [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6)] were
permissible, we cannot find any convincing ground for creating an
exception to that Rule here. '' T Teva itself was seen as the next step
in several cases rejecting "patent only" doctrines devised by the
Federal Circuit. 79 These cases include eBay v. MercExchange
80
and Gunn v. Minton.
8 1
Finally, the Hana decision may have its largest impact on
the way that questions of likelihood of confusion are resolved in
the future. In reality, tacking is not often an issue in litigation.
This may be because smart trademark owners often simply register
alterations made to their marks as new marks. Alternatively, alert
attorneys with a potential claim would likely file suit before there
was ever an alteration or attempt to tack to the former mark. The
biggest impact that the Hana decision may actually have in the fu-
ture may be seen in its effect on likelihood of confusion cases.
The resolution of tacking as a question of fact strongly im-
plies that the circuit split on the standard of review for likelihood
77 Teva Pharm. v. Sandoz, 135 S. Ct. 831, 833 (2015).
78 id.
79 Ronald Mann, Opinion Analysis: Court moves to rein in Federal
Circuit control over district court claim construction, SCOTUSBLOG
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/01/opinion-analysis-court-moves-to-
rein-in-federal-circuit-control-over-district-court-claim-construction
(Jan. 20, 2015, 1:51 PM).
80 eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 390-92 (2006) (overturning the Federal
Circuit's general rule that "courts will issue permanent injunctions against pa-
tent infringement absent exceptional circumstances," holding that the traditional
four-factor permanent injunction test applied also in patent cases. As this Court
has long recognized, a major departure from the long tradition of equity practice
should not be lightly implied. Nothing in the Patent Act indicates that Congress
intended such a departure.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
81 Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013) (holding that a legal malprac-
tice claim arising from a patent infringement case did not arise under federal pa-
tent law and could not be brought in federal court. The court also concluded that
state legal malpractice claims based on underlying patent matters would rarely,
if ever, arise under federal patent law for the purpose of bringing it into federal
court).
476
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of confusion should be resolved the same way.82 By the Petition-
er's own admission, the standard for tacking is much higher than
that for a likelihood of confusion analysis.83 Logically, once it has
been resolved that tacking is a question of fact for the jury, it is
clear that likelihood of confusion cannot be a question of law.
The implication of Hana on the likelihood of confusion test
was always an "elephant in the room" for the petitioners (as Justice
Kennedy referred to it in oral arguments).84 The only two circuits
(the Federal and the Sixth Circuit) currently treating likelihood of
confusion as a matter of law were also the only two treating tack-
ing as a matter of law prior to the Hana holding. 85
The counsel for the United States as [amicus curiae] in the
case pointed out that though there's a circuit split on whether like-
lihood of confusion is a question of law or a question of fact (af-
fecting its review on appeal), every circuit treats it as a question
for the jury.86 She pointed out that in the Second Circuit, jury de-
terminations on likelihood of confusion were reviewed by the ap-
peals court as a question of law, without giving much deference to
the jury's ultimate determination. 87 The justices' own questions
during oral argument on the subject indicate how little sense this
system makes. 88 In light of the Hana decision, it's almost assured
that any future likelihood of confusion case granted certiorari by
the court would be resolved in the same way.
V. CONCLUSION
After analyzing the Petitioner's claim, the Supreme Court
of the United States found that whether two trademarks may be
tacked for purposes of determining priority is a question for the ju-
82 Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Hana, 135 S. Ct. 907.
83 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 36, at 6 ("[T]he tacking standard
is considerably higher than the standard for likelihood of confusion")
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brookfield Communs. V.
W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999)).
84 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 82.85 id.
86 Id. at 40-41.
87 Id. at 41-42.
881d. at 42.
2015] 477
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ry.89 Therefore, it held that the District Court did not err in pre-
senting the tacking question to the jury and affirmed the judgment
of the Ninth Circuit.
90
Rachael Dickson*
89 Hana, 135 S. Ct. at 913.
9 0 1d.
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